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A R T I C L E

TURNING PARTICIPATION INTO
POWER: A WATER JUSTICE CASE STUDY
by Jaime Alison Lee
Jaime Alison Lee is Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Community
Development Clinic at the University of Baltimore School of Law.
I.

Introduction

This Article offers a revamped model of participatory
governance—the Constituent Empowerment Model (CE
Model)—which affirmatively shifts power to the voices of
marginalized constituents so that they can influence governmental policy. The CE Model focuses on three concepts
necessary to produce this shift in power to those who are
traditionally unheard: operationalized (feasibly realized)
participation; constituent primacy; and structural accountability. To illustrate how a CE system might be constructed,
this Article examines a model recently adopted in the city
of Baltimore, Maryland, that is designed to shift the balance of power between the water utility and its customers.
Baltimore offers a blueprint for how this new form of participatory governance could make local institutions more
responsive to the needs of disempowered constituents.1

II.

Participatory Governance:
Foundations and Vulnerabilities

A.

A Brief Introduction to the Foundations
of Participatory Governance and
Its Vulnerabilities

during each stage of the process, including problem identification, solution development and implementation, and
long-term monitoring, refinement, and accountability.2
Many laud the potential of participatory systems to include
more diverse perspectives and thus improve government
policy. However, participatory systems can also be appallingly ineffective.3 Participatory systems too frequently
solicit constituent input, yet ultimately disregard it, resulting in procedures that are merely cosmetic and produce no
meaningful reform or benefit.4
The core critique is that consensus-based “roundtable”
discussions amount to little more than a negotiation, which
favors those with preexisting power.5 This is problematic

2.

3.

Participatory governance encourages problem solving that
is meaningfully influenced by broad constituent input
Editors’ Note: This Article is adapted from Jaime A. Lee,
Turning Participation Into Power: A Water Justice Case
Study, 28 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1003 (2021), and used with
permission.
1.

See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 Yale L.J.
564, 572 (2017):
Local agencies also often operate at the edge of a blurry line between governmental action and public participation. Community
engagement in zoning regulation, school board decisions, police
review commissions, and other examples of the blending of public
and private underscore the breadth of citizen participation in local
agency work that is uncommon at the federal level.
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4.
5.

Other scholars use different formulations and definitions. E.g., Orly Lobel,
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 405 (2004); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative
State, 100 Geo. L.J. 53, 79 (2011).
See, e.g., Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons From Financial Regulation, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 441, 477-80; 484-86;
Michele E. Gilman, Five Privacy Principles (From the GDPR) the United
States Should Adopt to Advance Economic Justice, 52 Ariz. St. L.J. 368, 43739 (2020) (discussing “many barriers to effective public participation that
must be addressed to ensure that participation is meaningful, rather than
mere window dressing”); Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance Work for the Poor, 7 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev.
405, 413-17 (2013); Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70
Ohio St. L.J. 323, 327, 329, 347-48 (2009); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 406 (2016) (explaining that participatory
structures may mean shutting out the “disempowered”); David A. Super,
Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of
Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 559-63 (2008); Shelley Welton,
Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 457, 462 (2015)
(“FERC’s heavy reliance on participatory reforms to promote non-transmission alternatives pays lip service to these alternatives without meaningfully
changing planning processes.”).
See Lee, supra note 3, at 414-15; NeJaime, supra note 3, at 362.
See, e.g., Angela M. Gius, Dignifying Participation, 42 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 45, 58 (2018):
[There is] a real concern that participatory processes are too often driven by idealistic beliefs in the “transformative force of truth
and justice”—the idea that powerful institutions will change when
confronted with the truth of marginalized peoples’ stories, regardless of the group’s actual social power. . . . [T]his belief wrongly
assumes that “problems in our society occur because the ideas and
experiences of oppressed people are excluded from democratic debate and not because of a struggle between groups of people with
competing interests.”

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

8-2022

Copyright © 2022 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

for constituents who lack traditional forms of power6 and
whose marginalization from traditional problem-solving
processes is the very harm that broadly inclusive participatory structures are meant to remedy.7
Cosmetic processes thus cause dual harm to marginalized constituents; they not only fail to meet the needs of
those whom they are meant to serve, but they further alienate and subordinate them by falsely claiming to address
those needs.8
Accordingly, the CE Model seeks to reduce the likelihood of cosmetic processes by shifting power to marginalized constituents and eliminating the reliance on
consensus-based negotiations.
The following presents the CE Model as adopted in
Baltimore with the goal of forcing reform at a local governmental agency that has long been unresponsive to constituent needs. Baltimore presents a test case that is both
difficult and regrettably common, and thus constitutes an
appropriate laboratory in which to “stress-test” participatory governance theory.

B.

The Difficult Case Study: The Recalcitrant
and Unresponsive Local Agency

In Baltimore, the public water supply is controlled by
the Department of Public Works (DPW).9 DPW has the
power to deny water service if a customer has not paid her
bill,10 leading to inhumane conditions that threaten the
health and safety of both individuals and the greater public.11 Prior to 2019, unpaid water bills in Baltimore could

(footnote omitted); Simonson, supra note 3, at 405-06 (the focus on consensus and deliberation over pluralism means shutting out the disempowered).
6. See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring Administrative Law Structures From the Ground Up, 74 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 275, 277-78 (2009) [hereinafter Bach, Welfare Reform] (“[T]he history
of subordination and disproportionate power that characterizes social welfare history raises serious questions about the ability of poor communities
to participate effectively . . .”).
7. See id.; see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 83 (1997).
8. See K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 679, 698 (2020):
The dialectical relationship between structural inequalities and
political power compounds this difficulty: multiple layers of democratic and structural exclusion reinforce each other, reproducing
unequal, racialized systems of justice and of governance. . . . The
antidemocratic nature of our legal systems reinforces structural
inequality; the result is that increasing community participation
does not, on its own, truly tackle these deeply embedded structural problems.
see also Gráinne de Búrca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 227, 236 (arguing that “the democratic promise
of new governance is hollow”); Freeman, supra note 7, at 83; Joel Handler et
al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, and the
New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 Wis. L. Rev.
479, 510 (describing cosmetic processes as a “charade” and “cruel”); Lee,
supra note 3, at 406, 415.
9. Balt., Md., City Charter art. VII, §§27-46 (2020).
10. Balt., Md., City Code art. 24, §4-3 (2020); see Balt., Md., City Charter art. VII, §45.
11. Joan Jacobson, Keeping the Water On: Strategies for Addressing High Increases
in Water and Sewer Rates for Baltimore’s Most Vulnerable Customers, Abell
Rep. (Nov. 2016) at 8-12; cf. Elizabeth Mack & Andy Henion, Affordable
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trigger another severe penalty: losing one’s house through
the state-sponsored foreclosure system.12
Baltimore low-income water customers are especially
vulnerable to these injustices. A typical Baltimore household’s annual bill for water service more than quadrupled
between 2000 and 2017 and is expected to be over $1,100
by 2022.13
On top of unaffordability, Baltimore residents also suffer from an astonishingly inept and unresponsive bureaucracy. Water customers routinely experience bills that
skyrocket from one month to the next with no apparent
explanation.14 Even worse, the appeals process is woefully
inadequate and many complaining customers receive no
response at all from DPW, and thus must simply pay the
bill or risk losing water and possibly their home.
In Baltimore, as in many other jurisdictions,15 injustice
in water access disproportionately harms already vulnerable communities, including tenants, low-income, Black,
and elderly and disabled people.16

C.

The Failure of Traditional Accountability Tools
and the Need for an Alternative

The remedies usually available to constituents when government policies cause harm have long been ineffective
in Baltimore.17
Despite multifaceted and persistent efforts to motivate
change, the electorate’s rage and voting power have proven
largely impotent.18 Accountability mechanisms tradition-

12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

Water in US Reaching a Crisis, Mich. State Univ. (Jan. 17, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/U2W9-4NZL].
Joan Jacobson, The Steep Price of Paying to Stay: Baltimore’s Tax
Sale, the Risks to Vulnerable Homeowners, and Strategies to Improve the Process 3 (2014).
Roger Colton, Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, Baltimore’s Conundrum:
Charging for Water/Wastewater Services That Community Residents Cannot Afford to Pay 4 (2017).
See Off. of Inspector Gen., Balt. City, No. 20-00400-I, Confidential Report of Investigation 1 (2020) (explaining that “there are
thousands of digital water meters in the City and the County that are not
fully functional”).
See, e.g., Food & Water Watch, America’s Secret Water Crisis: National Shutoff Survey Reveals Water Affordability Emergency
Affecting Millions 7-8 (2018); Coty Montag, NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., Water/Color: A Study of Race & the Water Affordability Crisis in America’s Cities 13-15 (2019).
See Montag, supra note 15, at 31, 71; Martha F. Davis, Let Justice Roll
Down: A Case Study of the Legal Infrastructure for Water Equality and Affordability, 23 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 355, 357-58 (2016); see also Tom I.
Romero II, The Color of Water: Observations of A Brown Buffalo on Water Law
and Policy in Ten Stanzas, 15 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 329, 333 (2012).
See, e.g., Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970).
See Yvonne Wenger, Advocates Decry Baltimore’s Delay in Implementing
New Measures to Make Water More Affordable, Balt. Sun (July 13, 2020)
[hereinafter Wenger, Advocates Decry Baltimore’s Delay] [https://perma.cc/
QNE2-FSH8]; Yvonne Wenger, Baltimore Longtime Public Works Director Chow to Retire Feb. 1, Balt. Sun (Oct. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Wenger,
Baltimore Longtime Public Works] [https://perma.cc/4WK7-T3YF]; Rianna
Eckel, Will Mayor Scott Finally Fix Baltimore’s Busted Water Billing System?,
Balt. Brew (Jan. 13, 2021, 10:50 AM) [https://perma.cc/M6ZV-9JEC];
cf. Archives of Maryland, Historical List, Baltimore Mayors, 1797, Md. State
Archives [https://perma.cc/W336-HQTU]; Water Accountability and Equity Act, Balt. City Council [hereinafter Baltimore Water & Equity Act
History] [https://perma.cc/U2QR-69MU].
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ally used in the face of such governmental intransigence
might include lawsuits and administrative law remedies,19
which require abundant resources.20 Administrative law
tools intended to enhance government’s responsiveness to
its constituents have similarly afforded no relief.
Accordingly, new solutions are needed. Participatory
structures may provide another path to accountability, but
to succeed, they must reduce their vulnerability to merely
cosmetic outcomes.

Since the primary vulnerability of traditional participatory
processes lies in the failure to address existing power imbalances, the revamped model must address this problem by
affirmatively shifting power to constituent voice.
A prerequisite to implementing the CE Model is that
the more powerful party must be required to address
the needs of the less powerful. Power must be then
shifted to marginalized constituents through specific
techniques. The CE Model illustrates how these two
things may be accomplished.

ple is a judge who orders opposing litigants to enter into
settlement negotiations.24 The judge serves as an “executor” of the participatory process by imposing a mutual goal
on the parties and forcing them into discussions with each
other with the goal of finding common ground.
In the context of DPW, the role of executor fell to the
Baltimore City Council, which is empowered through its
legislative powers to impose new requirements on the water
utility. After years of encouragement by coalition members, in late 2019, the City Council unanimously voted
to pass legislation subjecting the utility to the CE Model
framework described in this Article, forcing DPW into a
participatory governance process with its constituents.25 In
imposing the CE Model, the City Council changed the
balance of power between the parties.
The Baltimore law has two major components. The first
addresses the affordability of water by capping water bills,
for those earning under 200% of the poverty level, at 3%
of the customer’s income, which meets the United Nations
(U.N.) standard for water affordability.26 The second,
which serves as the focus of this Article’s case study, uses a
participatory governance framework that redistributes certain power to water customers.

A.

B.

III. Turning Participation Into Power:
The CE Model

The Prerequisite: A Strong Executor Who Shifts
Power to Marginalized Constituents

The Constituent Empowerment Model:
A Case Study

To thwart cosmetic outcomes, the more powerful must be
incentivized to attend to the needs of the less powerful. In
Baltimore, given DPW’s long-standing refusal to address
customer needs, strong structural incentives needed to be
created for DPW to change course.

The CE Model adopted in Baltimore establishes an infrastructure for two critical functions: resolving individual
customer disputes and reforming customer-facing policies.
Both functions engage customers directly in the problemsolving process.

1.

1.

Destabilization as Incentive

One circumstance that can theoretically incentivize stakeholders to work more collaboratively is a “destabilizing
event,” usually a high-profile event that persuades both
sides that there is a problem resolvable only through both
sides’ participation.21 Highly emotional City Council hearings, constant press coverage of embarrassing problems,
and the sheer volume of consumer complaints might have
incentivized the utility to change its approach. In Baltimore, however, none of these events sufficiently “destabilized” the status quo or moved the utility toward reform.22

2.

Individual Dispute Resolution as Participatory
Problem Solving

The CE Model as adopted in Baltimore offers various paths
for resolving disputes.
First, a customer may choose to work with the utility’s
dispute resolution process, likely speaking to customer service representatives.27 Second, a customer may work with
the newly created Office of Water Customer Advocacy and
Appeals (Advocate).28 Third, the customer may participate in a traditional due process administrative hearing.29
Fourth, the customer can appeal in court.30

Structural Incentive

Where destabilization does not incentivize a recalcitrant
party to act, coercion by a third party might.23 One exam-

19. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1016, 1016-18 (2004).
20. See id. at 1050-59.
21. See id. at 424; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 19, at 1056, 1062,
1076-78.
22. See supra Section I.B.
23. See Lee, supra note 3, at 424, 426-28. See generally Jacobson, supra note 12.
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24. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 19, at 1051, 1055-56.
25. See supra Section I.B.
26. Five Reasons Baltimore Needs an Income-Based Water Affordability Program,
Food & Water Watch (Aug. 2017) [hereinafter Five Reasons] [https://
perma.cc/GLC8-J93H]; See Balt., Md., City Code art. 24, §§2-6, 2-17
to -22 (2020). According to the United Nations, affordability means three
percent of income. Five Reasons, supra.
27. Customer service contact is traditionally the first step in DPW’s dispute
process. See Press Release, Balt. City Dep’t of Pub. Works, Water Billing
Reviews (July 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/N56C-EWH9].
28. See Balt., Md., City Code art. 24, §§2-17, 2-19 to -20 (2020).
29. See id. §2-21.
30. See id. §2-21(i).
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The innovative and participatory component of this
multitiered system is the Advocate’s dispute resolution process, which is separate and distinct from traditional due
process hearings.31 The Advocate process is more informal
and involves both investigatory and problem-solving roles:
the Advocate seeks to identify the causes of the dispute; to
identify solutions for the customer that are workable for
their particular circumstances; and to prevent the problem
from reappearing in the future.32 This process is participatory in nature, as the Advocate uses customer input to find
practical, long-term solutions to disputes.33

2.

Systemic Reform and Long-Term Accountability

The Advocate is also responsible for developing systemwide
proposals to improve how the water utility treats its customers.34 These proposals must be based on what the Advocate has learned from its experiences addressing customers’
complaints; it must document and study what it learns
from individual disputes, collect and study data reported
systemwide, and justify its reform proposals based on the
needs and concerns of constituents.35
Once the Advocate drafts its proposals for reform, the
proposals are scrutinized during semiannual public hearings.36 The ongoing schedule of public hearings provides
continual monitoring, scrutiny, and adjustment of revised
rules and policies to ensure that these reforms are truly
responsive to constituent needs.
Taken together, these elements of the Baltimore CE
Model—the individual dispute resolution procedures and
the process for system reform—are designed to emphasize
the three essential requirements of constituent empowerment: operationalized participation (which makes participation feasible), constituent primacy (which gives weight
to constituent input), and structural accountability (which
provides ongoing oversight of the system itself). All three
are necessary37 to shift power to constituent voice and to
prevent cosmeticism.

C.

Concept One: Operationalized Participation

One of the greatest vulnerabilities of participatory systems
is the risk of insufficient participation.38 Traditional means
of gathering input can be costly and burdensome, especially for disempowered constituents. These burdens must
be lessened to make input feasible and meaningful.
Two strategies that may help to operationalize constituent input are the use of double-duty activities and proxies.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. §§2-17, 2-19 to -22.
Id. §2-17(b)-(c).
Id. §2-20.
See id. §2-17(b)(2)(ii).
Id. §2-17(c)(3), (d).
Id. §§2-17(c)(3), 2-23(e)(3).
While these elements are necessary for the system to succeed and their presence greatly increases the likelihood of such success, they certainly do not
assure success. This is one reason that the CE Model is designed to work in
conjunction with other methods. See infra Section II.E.2.
38. See Jaime Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 Colum. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 97, 136-37, 137 n.228 (2016).
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1.

Double-Duty Participation

Double-duty participation means collecting input through
a mechanism by which all parties are already engaged. In
the case of Baltimore’s water utility, the administrative
due process and dispute resolution procedures serve as this
mechanism.
Constituents will opt in because they stand to gain
tangible benefits in the form of a resolution to their concerns.39 Even constituents who distrust the agency are more
compelled to engage in a dispute resolution process than
in unstructured input-gathering processes, like voluntary
townhalls, surveys, focus groups, and roundtable discussions, which can offer no clear benefit.40
For agencies already providing due process hearings,
incorporating a participatory input-gathering function
into these procedures will likely incur negligible additional costs.41
Another example of double-duty participation is to put
data from existing activities to good use. For example, Baltimore’s Advocate must collect data on the nature of complaints made by customers; whether and how complaints
are being resolved; how social services agencies are called
upon by low-income water customers; who is enrolled in
discount plans and who is not; and other matters.42

2.

Participation Through a Proxy

Another way to operationalize constituent input is to use
proxies.43 The proxy in Baltimore is the Advocate, which
gathers, aggregates, analyzes, filters, reports on, and applies
a broad mass of constituent input.44 In centralizing these
functions, the proxy lightens the burden of participation
for each individual constituent and increases efficiency.
The use of double-duty input methods and the use
of proxies is designed to generate broad and meaningful
stakeholder participation through relatively efficient, lowcost means.

D.

Concept Two: Constituent Primacy

Once constituent input is collected, actually incorporating that input into policy reforms requires further structural designs. The CE Model affirmatively shifts power to

39. Code art. 24, §§2-17, 2-19 to -22 (2020).
40. See Requesting a Water Bill Adjustment, Balt. City Dep’t of Pub. Works
[https://perma.cc/TNE3-6ZHX]; see also Yvonne Wenger, Clarke Wants
Hearings Restored for Water Bill Disputes, Balt. Sun (July 14, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/H7V8-26XE] (providing additional context for water bill hearings in Baltimore). Compare Yvonne Wenger, Advocates Decry Loss of Appeal Hearings in Baltimore Water Billing Disputes, Balt. Sun (Feb. 23, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/K3NM-SJM2] (explaining how the hearing process was
limited a few years ago), with Amira Hairston, Baltimore City Water Bill
Hearing Scheduled for Wednesday Afternoon, WMAR Balt. (Mar. 4, 2020
5:22 PM) [https://perma.cc/R9Z9-T23A] (showing that individuals may
obtain hearings now).
41. See Code art. 24 §§2-17(b)-(c), 2-21.
42. Id. §2-17(c)-(d).
43. Lee, supra note 3, at 429.
44. See Code art. 24, §§2-17 to -23.
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constituent voices through a concept referred to as Constituent Primacy.
Constituent Primacy is implemented through four different strategies in Baltimore: (1) the empowerment of the
constituents’ proxy, (2) framework goals that prioritize and
give weight to constituent interests, (3) transparency, and
(4) protecting the proxy from institutional influence.

1.

The Empowered Proxy

The Baltimore Advocate is a uniquely powerful proxy. It
has the power to investigate broadly, to determine the outcome of disputes, to propose systemwide agency reforms,
and to speak for and act on behalf of constituents.45 It is
thus imbued with investigatory and reporting powers similar to those of an inspector general, with adjudicative powers similar to those of due process hearing administrators,
and with proposed rulemaking powers similar to those of
a regulatory agency.46

2.

Framework Goals That Mandate
Constituent Primacy

While a proxy needs sufficient power to make meaningful change, the proxy’s discretion must also be cabined to
ensure that the proxy faithfully promotes the interests of
its constituents.
One mechanism for cabining the proxy’s discretion is
the articulation of “framework goals.”47 Framework goals
set forth the overall purpose of a participatory process and
direct participants toward solving the problems at hand.48
Framework goals, combined with standards for assessing
progress toward those goals, are thus useful tools for cabining discretion.
In Baltimore, the legislated mandate of the Advocate is
to “promote fairness to customers”49; “serv[e] as a customer
advocate”50; “resolv[e] customer concerns”51; provide “problem-solving services”52; and “create solutions promoting
customer fairness.”53 These goals are deliberately designed
to be open-ended and flexible,54 while also clearly directing
the Advocate to serve customer interests.
The Advocate must also give “great weight” to “data
derived directly from customer experiences . . . in designing reform proposals that promote customer fairness.”55
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. §§2-17(b)-(c), 2-20(d) (2020).
Id. §§2-17 to -23.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 79.
Id.
Code art. 24, §§2-17(b)(1), 2-23(e)(3)(i)(B) (2020).
Id. §2-17(c)(1).
Id. §§2-17(c)(3)(ii)(A), (C), 2-23(e)(3)(i)(B).
Id. §2-20(a)(1).
Id. §2-17(d)(3)(ii).
Care must be taken to craft framework goals that transfer power to constituents’ voices while enabling constituents themselves to define the substantive
content of those goals. See Ford, supra note 3, at 480 n.148; see also Wendy
A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 Wis.
L. Rev. 239 [hereinafter Bach, Governance] (“[T]he absence of substantive
participation by poor communities in goal-setting and program design fundamentally undermines the experimentalist enterprise.”).
55. Code art. 24, §2-17(d)(4).
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These requirements elevate the importance of constituent
input and reduce the risk that the participatory process will
be merely cosmetic.56

3.

Transparency of Constituent Service

Constituent Primacy is further enforced through transparency. For example, in Baltimore, only if the public knows
what the Advocate is doing will the public know whether
the Advocate is, in fact, faithfully promoting their interests. Accordingly, the Advocate must publicly testify both
orally and in writing twice a year before the Committee
on Oversight and the public.57 It must report on its work,
the data it has collected, and how its reform proposals promote customer fairness.58 The Advocate must also report
on whether its prior reforms are working and how that success is being measured. The meetings must be open to the
public, who must be allowed to testify.59 Transparency at
each step should increase proxy accountability and thus
protect against a cosmetic process.60

4.

Protecting the Proxy From Institutional Influence

The fourth way that the CE Model shifts power to constituents is by requiring that a proxy be shielded from undue
influence exercised by others.
Ideally, a proxy like the Advocate would serve as an
independent watchdog and be situated wholly outside of
the formal boundaries of the agency’s sphere of influence.
Formal structural independence for the Baltimore Advocate was fiercely resisted by the utility, however, and failed
as a legislative matter.61
While complete structural independence and transparent hiring was not possible in Baltimore, other meaningful protective mechanisms succeeded. These provisions
are akin to those commonly used to protect other types
of executive branch officials serving in similar “watchdog”
roles within their own agency, such as inspectors general
and administrative law judges.62 Protections include legislatively mandated job qualifications for the chief Advocate,63
protections against adverse employment actions against
the Advocate and against agency review or approval of
the Advocate’s work, as well as limits on communications

56. See Lee, supra note 3, at 431 (assigning a measure of weight to constituent
input is a means of achieving the baseline conditions).
57. Id. §2-23(e)(3).
58. Id. §2-17(d)(4).
59. Id. §2-23(e)(3)(ii).
60. See Bach, Governance, supra note 54, at 294-95; Patience A. Crowder, “Ain’t
No Sunshine”: Examining Informality and State Open Meetings Acts as the
Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 Tenn. L.
Rev. 623, 656-58 (2007); see also Chester L. Mirsky & David Porter, Ambushing the Public: The Socio-Political and Legal Consequences of SEQRA
Decision-Making, 6 Alb. L. Env’t Outlook J. 1, 27 (2002).
61. See Balt. Md., Ordinance 20-336 (Jan. 27, 2020).
62. Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 1097, 1120, 1126 n.151, 1154
n.306 (2018).
63. See Balt., Md., City Code art. 24, §2-18(c) (2020).
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between the Advocate and other agency employees to avoid
the appearance of conflicts of interest.64
These four Constituent Primary strategies of the CE
Model shift power to disempowered constituents by giving their proxy enough power to make change, while also
seeking to ensure that that power is used for their benefit.

E.

Concept Three: Structural Accountability

Accountability—consequences for poor behavior—must
also be built into the participatory system in order to prevent cosmetic outcomes.
Charles Sabel and William Simon discuss the need for
“penalty defaults” that may be triggered if a participatory
process does not result in meaningful change.65 A penalty
default is so undesirable that the recalcitrant actor would
prefer to make the changes sought rather than suffer the
penalty. A classic example of a penalty default that can
motivate institutional change is the threat of litigation.
Especially in the case of a recalcitrant actor, some combination of strong penalty defaults must be imposed for the
participatory process to result in affirmative change.

1.

Penalty Defaults

Two penalty defaults strongly encourage the Baltimore
water utility to adopt the systemwide reforms that will be
proposed by the Advocate.
One penalty default is that, should DPW refuse to voluntarily adopt the Advocate’s reforms, the City Council may
use its legislative powers to turn those proposals into law.66
The second type of penalty default in Baltimore is semiannual public hearings before an oversight committee67 at
which customer satisfaction and reforms are discussed and
commented on.68 The threat of negative attention at these
hearings from the public, the media, the City Council, and
the mayor serves as a penalty default that should incentivize the utility to reform itself and become more responsive
to customer needs.69

2.

The Relationship of the CE Model to Other
Conceptions of Constituent Power

While the CE Model focuses on power generated through
procedural participation, structural accountability can also
arise from other kinds of constituent power, namely, adversarial protest, which is an equally crucial means of inducing reform. Importantly, people who engage in the CE
Model are also fully able to engage in contestatory, adversarial relationships against those in power. The CE Model
not only allows for this, but creates opportunity for it by
64. See id. §2-18(e).
65. Sabel & Simon, supra note 19, at 1067; see also Lee, supra note 3, at 428,
439; Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 81.
66. See Balt., Md., City Charter art. III, §11 (2020).
67. See Balt., Md., City Code art. 24, §§2-17, 2-21 to -23 (2020); see also
Jacobson, supra note 11, at 23.
68. See §§2-17(3), 2-23(e)(3).
69. See id. §§2-17(d), 2-21 to -23.
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requiring a regular public hearing, which can be a highly
effective forum for united, vocal, and adversarial protest.
This ability to exercise both participatory and adversarial
power simultaneously is an important change from traditional participatory systems, where the process is collaborative and consensus-seeking and participants thus cannot
advocate for themselves too strongly without risking losing
their “seat at the table.”70 The CE Model avoids this trade
off and is designed to work in tandem with other forms of
power-building techniques, not as an alternative to them.
This is a crucial design feature since multiple forms of power
can likely be combined, to great effect, throughout the
long, slow process of reforming a recalcitrant institution.

IV. Conclusion
It is hoped that the CE Model can serve as a blueprint for
increasing public participation in a variety of contexts. Traditional environmental law, for example, might incorporate CE Model strategies into participatory systems already
employed in the field.71 Marginalized voices also need
greater representation with respect to other public infrastructure systems72 and public services institutions, such as
school systems, police departments, social services agencies, transit departments, and public health departments.
Mayors and legislatures might map the basic structure used
in Baltimore onto their own executive branch agencies,
especially since many of the core elements—due process
hearings, constituent proxies, transparency, an oversight
body, and public hearings—are already familiar within the
governmental context.
It may also be possible that, where reform is desperately needed but a bolder transfer of power to constituents
may not be politically possible, the CE Model’s moderate power-sharing arrangement may be a more feasible,
effective strategy. Moreover, where reforms are likely to be
incremental and difficult, the CE Model may be particularly valuable in that it supports sustainable, long-term
engagement and monitoring.
Overall, the CE Model is meant to offer a flexible infrastructure that can be modified and experimented with in
other circumstances in which greater representation of
marginalized voices is needed.

70. See Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in Cause Lawyers and Social Movements 302, 303 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006); Freeman,
supra note 7, at 84-85; see also Angela M. Gius, Dignifying Participation, 42
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 45, 57 n.36 (2018).
71. E.g., Lobel, supra note 2, at 423 (“Environmental law has been at the forefront of new governance experiments.”); Anne E. Simon, Valuing Public
Participation, 25 Ecology L.Q. 757, 757 (1999).
72. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion
Through the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2447,
2447-48 (2018).
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